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S everal nonrevolutionary cases of transition to democracy are modeled. ferent preferences and strategic choices between the alternatives of continuity, refo and rupture of the authoritarian regime are used to define conventional distin between hard-liners, soft-liners, and opposition more precisely. Six groups of emerge. Using game theory, the interactions among these actors are formally an
The possibility of political pact in the first phase of change is identified with the p bility of cooperation between players in games in which the equilibrium is a de outcome. Three models of transition by agreement are established: agreed reform wi the ruling bloc, controlled opening to the opposition, and sudden collapse of the auth tarian regime. Each of these models entails differences in the pace of change and limits of the pact and can be associated with different cases of transition in So Europe, Latin America, and Eastern Europe.
Around one-third of the democratic regimes existing today are the result of transitions from authoritarian regimes that have taken place since 1973. Three large waves can be distinguished: in Southern Europe in the mid-1970s, in Latin America in the 1980s, and in Eastern Europe since the end of the 1980s. In many of these processes, frequent and praiseworthy references to the Spanish model of transition to democracy have been made, generally identifying it with negotiations and pacts among political elites and consensus among the citizenry that avoid acts of revenge, violent confrontations, and civil war. Spanish politicians have often presented themselves abroad as protagonists of this process; and numerous politicians from other countries in transition have sought inspiration in the Spanish experience.1 At the same time, scholars on comparative transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America have paid particular attention to the "Spanish model." One of them, Juan J.
Linz, who has studied the breakdown of democracies extensively, returned to this subject after the first wave of transitions to democracy (Linz 1978 (Linz , 1981 . The references to the Spanish model are also abundant in the important collective work directed by O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986) in which Adam Przeworski goes so far to say that "Spain seems the country to be studied" (1986, 3, 61) .
To model the Spanish transition, it is important to observe the first phases of the process. It should be especially noted that real negotiations and pacts between the former Francoists, converted to re-' formists of the authoritarian regime, and the democratic opposition-which tend to be presented as characteristic of this case-did not take place until after the first free elections, held on 15 June 1977, a year-and-a-half after the death of the dictator on 20 November 1975. In fact, these postelectoral pacts (especially the elaboration of a new democratic constitution, the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOLUME 85 NO. 4 DECEMBER 1991 decentralization or creation of the "autonomous communities" and the "Moncloa agreements" in economic policy) were largely conditioned by the composition of the elected Cortes, in which the reformists of the government, the Union del Centro Democratico, failed to obtain the majority to which they aspired. Instead, in the preelectoral period, which tends to be decisive in many aspects of processes of transition, the reformists did not agree with the democratic opposition but, rather, with the continuists of the authoritarian regime. Based on this case, some of the characteristic features of the first phase of the transition to democracy are modeled below in a manner I believe valid for interpreting processes of change of regime in multiple real cases. The conceptual categories and the analyses presented, based on game theory, are especially appropriate for a phase characterized by much uncertainty among the actors about the future and by the predominance of strategic behaviors-namely the phase between the liberalization (which permits the definition of positions and the identification of actors) and the first free elections (which establish a more precise relationship of forces and tend to move the interaction of groups within parliamentary and state institutions).
Game theory furnishes useful tools to study situations of interaction between several groups with contradictory and at the same time interdependent interests, such as transitions to democracy. The theoretical framework focuses on choices and strategies; but some findings of our formal analysis also indicate the importance of social and cultural factors in identifying the relevant actors and their orders of preferences, aspects to be further developed in the future. For the moment, I present a definition of the alternatives and actors of the process and a formal analysis of the interactions, especially in some games permitting a beneficial cooperation between players, in order to interpret and stress certain features of real processes of transition.
Alternatives and Actors
In light of numerous cases, it may be said that in the face of an authoritarian regime, three basic alternatives can be defined. First, there is the continuity (C) of the regime, which sometimes may be based on a successful institutionalization process of the authoritarian government. Second, there is a moderate reform (r) of the authoritarian institutions, which generally leads to a limited democracy. Those who favor this alternative accept that a postauthoritarian regime has to be based on a plurality of parties and on free elections by universal suffrage but usually attempt to impose some restrictions on the activity of certain parties, an electoral system that deviates representation in their favor, the continuity of certain institutions, and the absence of the settling of accounts and reprisals against authoritarians. When the transition necessarily entails change in the economic system, as in the socialist countries, they also attempt to maintain control of some parts of the productive apparatus. Third, there is the rupture (R) with the legal and institutional framework of the authoritarian regime and the initiation of a constituent process without restrictions for the establishment of a democratic regime (as well as a market economy in the transition from the socialist regimes).
It is easy to line up the three alternatives according to a greater or lesser degree of change or discontinuity with the past: R, r, C. There are six different orders of preference of the three alternatives, which define six different actors or strategic groups in the political process of transition, as seen in Table 1 . Understand that column 3, for example, means that for the persons of this group the first preference is r, the second preference is R, and Most Preferred R R r r C C C r R C r R Least Preferred r C C R R r Note: R = rupture; C continuity; and r reform. the third prefrence is C; that is, reformists prefer reform to rupture and rupture to continuity. The rest of the columns indicate the other possible orders of preferences.
These different orderings exist among citizens as well as among political elites and allow us to identify the actors of the political process of transition more precisely than the usual simple distinctions between "hard-liners" and "soft-liners." Broadly, they can be defined as follows:
1. Revolutionaries. Of the existing alternatives, they prefer rupture; but rather than reform, which would only halfway satisfy popular demands and would mortgage possibilities for more radical change for many years, they prefer to preserve revolutionary militancy and continue the struggle against continuity. 2. Rupturists, or democratic opposition.
They prefer rupture but would rather accept reform (which can provoke internal contradictions among continuists and allow a more gradual and somewhat slower advance toward the achievement of some democratic objectives) than continuity. Some former members of the revolutionary opposition may join this group following experiences with negative results, such as a previous civil war. However, the failure of a transition by agreement can also push some members of this opposition toward the first group's position of intransigent radicalism. 3. Reformists. They desire a change of regime, controlling it better from above, preserving some elements of continuity, and benefiting from the advantages that their positions of power give them. Some members of the democratic opposition may adapt their preferences, identifying them with those of the reformists, after having reached the conclusion that rupture is impossible or too costly and because, above all, they wish to rid themselves of the dictatorship. 4. Openists or promoters of a political thaw (aperturistas in Spain or aberturistas in Brazil). They desire moderate reform, but faced with the danger of rupture, they prefer to resist by joining the continuists. Some authoritarians may adopt this position after reaching the conclusion that continuity is impossible and that rupture is to be feared more than anything else.
5. Continuists. They prefer continuity but would rather accept reform (which would allow them to conserve some privileges from the past) than the feared rupture.
6. Involutionists (known as "el bunker" during the Spanish transition). They aspire to continuity, but in the face of a democratizing reform that would dilute the foundations of the authoritarian regime, they would prefer a direct confrontation with the rupturist opposition as a way to establish a new dictatorship. Some continuists may feel compelled to radicalize their position toward those in this column if their initial concessions to reform end up leading to the success of rupture.
Observe that groups 2-5 maintain orders of preference consistent with the above gradation R, r, C; for this reason I will call these groups gradualists. On the other hand, groups 1 and 6 prefer the two extreme options to the intermediate one; for this reason I will call these groups maximalists.
Maximalists may adopt more or less bombastic expressions, such as "Better to die on one's feet than live on one's knees," as some Spanish communist leaders said during the civil war of 1936-39, or "Better to die with honor than live in contempt," a common expression in some publications of Spanish fascists of the 1960s.
Often, the political culture of these groups includes elements such as the interest in "unmasking the true nature" of the enemy, the opinion that their possibilities for success increase in a situation of open confrontation, the rejection of "lukewarm attitudes," the shared hatred of liberalism more than even communism or fascism, and dialectical pirouettes such as "The worse, the better." Obviously, in both cases, to live on one's feet or with honor is preferred above all; but in contrast to the magnificence attributed to that main objective, the alternative implying humiliation or mediocrity is relegated to last place. Understandably, characteristic slogans of the gradualist groups, such as the "lesser evil" or "A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush," are judged by maximalists to be expressions of moral misery. The actors in columns 2-5 tend to be characterized by risk neutrality or risk aversion, that is, caution and fear, and those in columns 1 and 6, by a propensity for risk and a taste for vivere pericolosamente ("living dangerously," the slogan of Italian fascism).
This distinction between gradualists and maximalists may be compared with that outlined by Duncan Black in his study of the conditions of equilibrium in voting. While the preferences of gradualists may be represented by singlepeaked curves, those of maximalists would take the form of multipeaked curves. According to this theory, maximalist opinions would always be defeated in any voting in which gradualists converge around an alternative preferred by the majority; but if the maximalists had sufficient support, they would generate cyclical majorities (Black 1987, esp. chaps. 4-7) . This suggests that if maximalists are sufficiently influential, they can generate a situation of prolonged political instability, with an absence of equilibrium. Otherwise, they tend to be excluded from the consensus among gradualists. I will return to this suggestion later.
It may be significant of maximalism that the same expression, ultras, was used in Spain during the 1970s to describe the nostalgics of the early Francoism, which would correspond to Group 6 of our table, and in the Soviet Union of the 1980s to refer to certain members of the radical opposition who would fall into group 1.
Although perhaps in both cases these would be persons of similar right-wing ideology, in conventional terms, transition politics is characteristically not ideology-or class-based; rather, actors are distinguished fundamentally by their strategic orientations in the face of change. In fact, the orders of preference here presented can be adopted by various ideologies and, of course, by civilians as well as members of the military. The same ordering can be shared by different organizations; and several of them may coexist within a party, a platform of several parties, a government, or a military body, so that in each case an applied analysis will have to carefuly delimit those collectives to which one can attribute the same will and a single criterion of choice.
The proportions of political strength and social support of one or another strategic group probably depend on factors like the social structure and the duration and forms of domination of the authoritarian regime. They are also, however, the expression of attitudes of initiative, self-confidence, daring, imitation, and opportunity of their leaders, as well as of the opinion formed in different sectors of society through reflection on past experience. As I have already suggested in presenting the various groups, some persons may change their affiliation to one group or another in the course of the transition process, given the characteristic uncertainty in which the actors perform and the abundancy of unexpected or undesired consequences of their choices in such a fluid situation. In any case, the identification of the six groups of actors is, as we shall see, sufficiently pertinent and allows us more precisely to define the "various currents and factions" that O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) perceived among hardliners and soft-liners (see also, for some ideas of this sort, although centered on alternatives of economic change, Hirschman 1963, 277-97) .
It is also convenient for our analysis to retain affinities by blocs: the opposition bloc, made up of groups 1 and 2, revolutionaries and rupturists, coincide in their first preference R; the bloc of soft-liners, made up of groups 3 and 4, reformists and openists, coincide in their first preference r; and the bloc of hard-liners, made up of groups 5 and 6, continuists and involutionists, coincide in their first preference C. The last two blocs make up what can be called a broader-ruling bloc.
Formal Analysis of the Interactions
The interesting situations-because their result is not obvious are those in which none of the mentioned groups or blocs is sufficiently predominant to impose its first preference by itself on the others. In these situations, in which the Though each group interacts with the others, I limit myself to interactions by twos. Thus, each actor has to choose not between the three alternatives defined above, R, r, and C but between pairs of alternatives, that is, situations defined by the actor's choice and the choice of the interlocutor. We need to establish, then, orders of preferences for each actor with respect to each pair of alternatives. To do this, in accordance with the three alternatives, I construct the ordering of pairs of alternatives presented in Table 2 , graduated from greater to lesser degree of pressure for change.
To avoid unnecessary complications and in order to maintain an appropriate degree of realism, I will consider only the situations created by the choices made between each actor's first two preferences.
The choice of an actor's last preference should be considered, rather than an interaction, a complete defeat or surrender to the predominance of the other actor; hence, its inclusion would not add any interesting development. I adopt the logical hypothesis that each actor's first preference is the pair of alternatives with a degree of pressure for change that corresponds to the first preferred alternative (high and very high for those who prefer R, medium for those who prefer r, and low and very low for those who prefer C); each actor's second preference is the pair of alternatives with a degree of pressure for change that corresponds to the second preferred alternative, and so on. I assume that each actor follows the complementary criterion that when there are several pairs of alternatives, with the same degree of pressure for change (as at the medium level), the achievement of the objective that satisfies that level by coinciding with the interlocutor is preferred to the constant conflict and confrontation between incompatible alternatives, since in the latter situation no alternative can win. Consequently, the order of preferences derived from this criterion can be considered an expression of an attitude relatively inclined to pacts. I will return to this later. These assumptions are enough to construct a complete order of preferences for the six actors defined with respect to the pairs of alternatives, as seen in Table 3 (where the initial sign of each pair indicates the choice of the actor and the second sign the choice of the interlocutor).
Thus, for example, group 2 (rupturists) prefers the pair of alternatives following the same order from top to bottom as presented in Table 2 (eliminating those where the choice would be the actor's last preference, C); group 5 (continuists) prefers the pairs of alternatives in an exactly inverse order (eliminating those where the choice would be the actor's last preference, R); group 3 (reformists) first prefers the pairs of alternatives with a medium degree of pressure for change, then the pairs with a high and very high degree of pressure, and finally the pairs with a low degree of pressure (eliminating those where the choice would be the actor's last preference, C) and, in case of pairs with the same degree of pressure for change, giving priority to the pair in which there is a coincidence with the interlocutor and in which the actor's most Least Preferred CR rC rC rR rR RC Note: R = rupture; C = continuity; and r = reform. preferred alternative is adopted, and so on.
Games
We can now proceed with the formal analysis of the interactions among the actors using game theory. The combinations of six elements by twos give us a total of 15 different pairings of actors. In each situation defined by the choices of two paired actors, an ordinal value from four to one is given for each actor, according to the orderings in Table 3 . The corresponding games, whose matrices can be found in the Appendix, can be classified according to the complete taxonomy of 78 nonequivalent two-by-two games elaborated by Rapoport and Guyer (1966) . We find the following categories: Preemption games, or two-equilibria games with nonequilibrium outcome. That with the remaining interaction between groups of distant blocs, the two maximalist actors: 1-6. It is interesting to observe that in an interpretation of this game as a confrontation, known as Let-George-Do-It, or Apology, each party wants to settle with a conciliatory apology, but each prefers the other to take the initiative to avoid "losing face"-a very appropriate image for a confrontation between political extremes (Figure A-7 This alternative is rupture, R, in game 2-6 and continuity, C, in game 1-5. In descriptive terms, this means that the democratic opposition can obtain its objective of rupture if the relevant adversary in confrontation is a hard-liner group with maximalist strategic attitudes. This model might possibly explain some aspects of the establishment of democracy in certain countries in Europe in historical periods previous to those I consider here, including some processes that took place at the end of World War Il. at least in those countries where there was an organized antifascist resistance by the main democratic parties. In a similar manner, the continuists can obtain their objective, continuity of the authoritarian regime, if the adversary with which they are in confrontation is a group with maximalist strategic attitudes, as shown by the survival capacity of certain nontotalitarian dictatorships when they confront a revolutionary opposition. In other words, maximalists on each side are defeated by the gradualists of the opposite bloc.
Confrontation between Two Alternatives or a Cycle. In games 1-3 and 2-3 an outcome Rr is obtained; that is, the interaction of the two opposition groups and the reformists produces a confrontation without agreement between the alternatives of rupture and reform. In games 4-5 and 4-6 an outcome rC is obtained; that is, the interaction of the openists and the two hard-liner groups produces a confrontation without agreement between the alternatives of reform and continuity. In game 1-6 an outcome RC is obtained; that is, the interaction of the two maximalist groups, revolutionaries and involutionists, produces a confrontation without agreement between the alternatives of rupture and continuity. In games 1-4 and 3-6 cycles are obtained; that is, in the remaining interactions of the maximalists not included in the cases already mentioned, confrontations without agreement also take place between different alternatives, in these cases with changing outcomes that may indicate a situation of general political instability.
Deficient Equilibrium Improvable by
Cooperation between the Two Actors.
They are those represented by games 2-4, 2-5, and 3-5. According to the orders of preferences I have hypothesized, the cooperation leading to an agreed and efficient outcome is only one possibility. There is no guarantee that this outcome will occur, especially if the actor or actors motivated, in each case, to choose the alternative leading to a better outcome do not have the necessary capability for promise and threat to make the other comply with the commitment. This means that cooperation would not be possible if the structure of preferences of the actors did not follow the complementary criterion adopted before on the preferability of coinciding over confrontation when both outcomes entail the same degree of pressure for change. But even following this criterion, the possibility appears only in very few interactions, as we have seen.
The real meaning of these games, the matrices of which I reproduce in Figure 1 , is the possibility of political change by means of a pact. As can be easily observed, success depends in large part on the subjective conditions of the actors to take advantage of the opportunity.
Game 2-5 is the celebrated prisoner's dilemma, where a deficient outcome is reached, situated in the upper left-hand corner of the matrix, and both players are motivated to cooperate to transfer the outcome to the lower right-hand corner of the matrix, that is, to reform by agreement. However, once there, both players are also motivated to depart from this Reformists Openists Continuists R r C r C r C 2 3 12 R 2 3 4 1 2 R 2 2 X 02 2 R 23 ~22
Continuists RupturIsts Rupturists r 1 2 3 4 r 1 2 3 4 r 1 4 3 3 outcome-so they need mutual promises and threats to consolidate the agreement.
In games 2-4 and 3-5, games with a single, force-vulnerable equilibrium, a deficient outcome is also achieved in the upper lefthand corner of the matrix, and both players are motivated to cooperate to transfer the outcome to the lower righthand corner, that is, to reform by agreement. In these cases, however, once there, only one player (group 2 in the first game and group 5 in the second) is motivated to abandon this outcome-so it is the other player who needs promises and threats to consolidate the agreement.
Transitions by Cooperation
These theoretical findings signify in political terms that there are several possible outcomes to the pressures faced by an authoritarian regime. One possible way to democracy is the change achieved by rupturists confronting an adversary with involutionist strategic attitudes (interaction 2-4). In many other situations a confrontation without solution between different alternatives-that is, a more or less permanent political instability and perhaps 'a civil war-can occur. Finally, there are three possible pacts, or nonrevolutionary transitions. These are 1. between rupturists and openists (interaction 2-4) 2. between reformists and continuists (interaction 3-5) 3. between rupturists and continuists (interaction 2-5)
In other words, there is one possible pact between an opposition group and a softliner group, another between a soft-liner group and a hard-liner group, and another between an opposition group and a hard-liner group. The exclusion of maximalists from the consensus among some gradualists appears, then, to be confirmed.
It seems logical to assume that the groups that occupy intermediate positions among the pairs mentioned are also incorporated in the new political framework, although they occupy a subordinate role in the process of change (e.g., the pact 3-5 would entail the inclusion of group 4). But what is most interesting is that there do not seem to be real possibilities for agreement when the two main actors of the interaction are situated in contiguous spaces in the continuum from greater to lesser change (like those represented in Tables 1 and 3 ) but only between actors relatively distant in their strategic positions. Thus, the pact between soft-liners and hard-liners is not carried out by proximate openists and continuists-as seen in the interaction 4-5, the outcome of which is a confrontation between reform and continuity-but rather by the more distant reformists and continuists (3-5). In the same manner, the pacts of the rupturist opposition are not reached with reformists-the outcome of the interaction 2-3 being a confrontation between rupture and reform-but, rather, with openists (2-4) or continuists (2-5).
This paradox is explained by the capacity of threat and deterrence that can be found between actors who are relatively distant in their strategic positions, leading one or both of them to accept a secondbest alternative more readily than the proximity of strategic positions does.
Expressed in more formal terms, in interactions 2-3 and 4-5 the two players coincide in their two most preferred alternatives, although they prefer them inversely. In this manner, neither of the two can threaten the other with choosing the second preference, since it would only satisfy the first preference of the interlocutor. Conversely, in interactions 3-5 and 4-2, the player named first in each case can threaten to adopt the second preference, which is the worst for the interlocutor.
The latter is then forced to pick the lesser evil of the second preference, which is the first preference of the first player. In interaction 2-5 the threat is mutual, given that the first preference of each player is the worst for the other, so that both are motivated to coincide in the second.
In the real world, this capability of agreement between actors who are relatively distant can explain surprising and apparently mysterious occurrences, such as great difficulties in reaching agreements in negotiations between groups whose preferences are too proximate, reformist government's capacity for maneuverability in trying to persuade continuists to accept reform of the authoritarian regime, and the outstanding role of certain hardliners with a notorious history of repression in some pacts with the opposition (whom they themselves might have persecuted at one time).
The Spanish Way and Other Ways of Transition
If we follow the analysis of Rapoport and Guyer (1966) , the three games mentioned can be the object of some interesting observations that help to enlighten real cases of transition by agreement.
Agreed Reform
We can observe that in game 3-5 only group 5 (continuists) is motivated to accept reform at first. But in the efficient outcome reached through cooperation, only group 3 (reformists) is satisfied (having obtained the first preference, with ordinal value 4), while the second is motivated to return to continuity. For this reason, the first needs promises and threats to consolidate reform and avoid the possible generation of a cycle. These characteristics suggest that cooperation toward the outcome rr can only occur at the initiative of group 3, which is actually the most interested in reform.
An initiative of this type by reformists toward continuists led to the success of the reform in Spain between July 1976 and June 1977. After the death of the dictator Franco in November 1975, King Juan Carlos named as president of the government the last president of General Franco, Carlos Arias, who can rightly be considered' a genuine continuist. However, the new government also included some openists-promoters of a reform of the Francoist legal framework-particularly Manuel Fraga, who was named second vice president and minister of the interior. The openists of the government tried to negotiate the reform in a mixed commission (especially created for that purpose) between representatives of the government and the Consejo Nacional del Movimiento, the single party of the dictatorship where there was a heavy concentration of 'Francoists. With a logic that my framework may explain with interaction 4-5 (openists and continuists), the openists' capacity to pressure the continu ists was insufficient, and the reform neg tiations failed. Meanwhile, popular movements in the form of strikes and demonstrations promoted by the rupturist opposition and some revolutionary groups, reached their highest levels. After this failure, in July 1976, King Juan Carlos named a new president of the government, the reformist Adolfo Suarez, who resolutely faced down the continuists. Suarez soon presented a bill for political reform and submitted it to the consideration of both the commanders of the armed forces and (as the Francoist laws required) the organic Cortes.
Suarez pressured the continuists with a new combination of promises and threats. On the one hand, he promised the Francoists the continuation of the monarchy in the person of Juan Carlos de Borbon, who had been designated by General Franco as his successor; the maintenance of the "unity of Spain"; and ("given its current status and demands") the exclusion of the communists, as well as the revolutionary opposition, from the political arena. The Francoists were particularly sensitive to these questions ever since the military uprising against the Spanish Republic and the subsequent civil war of 1936-39, in which the form of government, regional nationalisms, and the influence of the communists were some of the main issues. Suarez also accepted the petitions of continuists and openists in favor of an electoral system that rewarded representation in rural areas (which also benefited him personally) and the establishmnt of a second chamber elected by a plurality system with a certain number of senators designated by the king.
On the other hand, the army chief of staff and Suarez's direct collaborator, Lieutenant General Manuel Guti6rrez Mellado, called for political abstention by all military commanders under threat of expulsion from the military. This threat was applied exemplarily to hard-liner Lieutenant General Fernando de Santiago, first vice-president since the previous government, who was dismissed and relegated to the reserve for having expressed his disagreement with the government project on labor unions. Suarez also threatened the members of the Cortes named by Franco with the dispossession of their posts in state companies, with making public the recordings of telephone taps the government secret services had made in their homes and offices, and with the transmission on television of the nominal vote of their bill for reform in case they decided to vote no.
With these and other measures, Adolfo Suarez obtained the acceptance of the reform of the authoritarian regime by the very Francoists who occupied the institutions; that is, he successfully promoted the cooperation we have seen is possible in interaction 3-5 (reformists and continuists) while avoiding a further cycle and convoked general elections that would open a new phase.
It is important to note that during this process there was never any real cooperation between the reformist government and the rupturist opposition. In fact, Suarez used the conversations with the opposition as a latent threat to the continuists that he would join the rupturist project if they did not accept the reform. It can be said, then, that the first phase of the Spanish transition was a reform pactada within the ruling bloc, without interaction with the opposition. The only important concession made by Suarez to the opposition before the elections was the result of his direct negotiation with the general secretary of the Spanish Communist party (PCE), Santiago Carrillo, for the party's legalization. After the legal approval of the reform by the organic Cortes, the leaders of the PCE followed the rest of the opposition parties and presented the documents that the law required to be legalized. The communists, however, did not present their traditional statutes, but other improvised documents in which they substituted an affirmation of democratic principles for their traditional revolutionary and republican objectives. At a secret meeting in Madrid, SuArez and Carrillo agreed that the PCE would be legalized if it expressly accepted the monarchy and the two-colored monarchical flag, an agreement fulfilled by both parts two months before the elections convoked by Suarez. In this manner, all the parties of the rupturist opposition accepted the legal framework of reform agreed upon by reformists and continuists, excluding from their electoral platforms any questioning of the monarchical form of government or the unitary form of the state. Meanwhile, Suarez imposed an electoral system that favored him and utilized the advantages of power to organize a candidacy with himself leading the Uni on del Centro Democratico (UCD) ballot.
Negotiations and pacts between reformists and the rupturist opposition as a whole did not take place in Spain, as I have said, until after the elections of June 1977. The reformist candidacies of the UCD received a plurality of votes; but despite the serious deviations created by the electoral system imposed by the government, they failed to obtain a majority of deputies. That is why Suarez's reformists had to abandon the limited constitutional reform they had prepared and accept the elaboration of a new constitution with a wide consensus in the new democratic Cortes in December 1978 (finally approved a year-and-a-half later). The majority of parties also agreed on a new decentralization or creation of the "autonomous communities" and the "Moncloa agreements" in economic policy. It was in this later process when the objective of rupture-a democratic regime without restrictions-was obtained, although by a different path than the one originally desired by the rupturists. But these postelectoral pacts no longer correspond to the initial phase of the transition, which I am modeling by defining the actors according to their strategic orientations. In fact, other actors, better defined by government platforms and ideologies-mainly the centrist, socialist, communist, and Catalan nationalist parties-did this by way of vote trading, logrolling, and parliamentary coalitions, which were based no longer on fears and subjective expectations of the future but, rather, on the specific number of deputies each obtained.
These later concessions and pacts of Suarez with the rupturist opposition led to his confrontation with the continuists. They accused him of "treason" and repeatedly conspired with some involutionist groups to organize a coup d'6tat, which failed. In fact, the partial agreement of Suarez with the communists and, after the elections, the constitutional and other pacts with the opposition parties, broke the agreements that the reformist president of the government had contracted with the Francoists during the first phase of the transition.
Nevertheless, the fact that the transition was initiated by way of an agreement between reformists and continuists (3-5), without the participation of the opposition, has had consequences for the Spanish democracy. For many years, the elements of continuity with the previous authoritarian regime have been very important. Not only was the monarchy consolidated, but no breakdown in the armed forces or any purge of the political police took place. At the same time, there has been a low level of politization of the citizenry, thus conceding a broad margin of autonomy to the political elites. The process and the result of the Spanish transition of 1976-77 contrast with the process and result in a previous historical situation, the Second Spanish Republic of 1931-36. Its instability and tragic end were influenced in large part by the prominent activity of the maximalists and the weakness of gradualist attitudes in the various ideological fields. There is no doubt that the reflection on that disaster and the trauma that the civil war of 1936-39 provoked in broad layers of Spanish society fed the fear of the repetition of a violent confrontation. This fear induced in the principal political actors a predisposition to negotiation and compromise that has been formalized in our analysis and that is usually pointed out as the characteristic feature of the "Spanish model" of transition. (For a more in-depth analysis .of the events of the Spanish transition and its implications for consolidated democracy, see my book [Colomer 1990 ]; for an analysis in English, see Maravall and Santamaria 1986 and, for the postelectoral period, Gunther 1985.)
Controlled Opening and Collapse
Unlike the Spanish model, the other ways of transition by agreement that have been identified coincide in including the opposition among the decisive actors of the first phase. In game 4-2 only the second player (rupturists) is motivated to accept reform at first. But in the efficient outcome obtained by way of cooperation, only the first player (openists) is satisfied with obtaining the first preference (with an ordinal value of 4), while the second is motivated to return to rupture. For this reason, the first player needs to have enough deterrent capability to consolidate reform and avoid the possible generation of a cycle. These characteristics suggest that in this game, the cooperation toward an rr outcome can only occur at the initiative of group 4, the openists, while the rupturist opposition has to adapt to it.
There are several cases where, coinciding with the indication of this framework, the openists have tried to set the conditions of transition and have maintained a certain control over the initial, rather slow, rhythm of the liberalization and democratization process. Although my purpose here is more conceptual than descriptive, I can illustrate its analytical possibilities by referring briefly to several cases.
The clearest one is probably Brazil between 1982 and 1985, where there was first a period of liberalization (distenpao) and opening (abertura), exercised by the governments of generals Ernesto Geisel and Jodo Figuereido against the hardliners of General Sylvio Frota. Later, a slow democratization process included an implicit-or explicit but secret-political pact of some government soft-liners, the regime party, and the armed forces with the opposition to name opposer Tancredo Neves, leader of the Movimento Democratico Brasileiro as president, in January 1985. Following this, direct presidential elections were convoked for November of that same year. Although some differences between the Spanish, Brazilian, and other cases probably have to do with broad differences in socioeconomic and other structural factors, these would not necessarily explain the attitudes and strategic choices of the relevant actors that I stress here.
A formally similar situation of interaction between openists and rupturists may be seen in the transition that took place in Uruguay between 1983 and 1984. Some soft-liners of the authoritarian regime, headed by the president, General Gregorio Alvarez, and General Rapela of the political affairs commission of the armed forces, maintained conversations over a period of months with representatives of most of the opposition, the Partido Colorado and the Frente Amplio (excluding the Partido Blanco, which they considered to be responsible for most of the political instability in the period previous to the coup d'etat). Finally, the Acuerdo del Club Naval was reached, and presidential elections were convoked for November 1984.
A similar process of cooperation might also explain the democratization process initiated in Chile in 1989, including the agreement that General Augusto Pinochet would continue to be head of the armed forces while presidential elections were held with the participation of the opposition parties led by Christian Democrat Patricio Alwyn. Given the initiative of the openists in all these processes and their imposition of certain initial conditions, such as a calendar, the offices to be elected, the electoral system, and the absence of acts of revenge, I propose to call this model of transition controlled opening to the opposition.
The third model is the one formalized in game 2-5 (rupturists and continuists), which, as I have said, is a prisoner's dilemma. Here, both players are motivated to abandon their initial choice and shift to reform, as long as the other cooperates in the same maneuver. But once this new result has been obtained, neither is fully satisfied, and both are motivated to return to their dominant strategy. Thus, the success of the cooperation requires that the two actors employ deterrents and that the two make concessions. This need for symmetrical and conditioned efforts by both parts suggests that the agreement needs to be more synchronized and probably quicker than in the previous games, where one of the actors maintains an initiative to which the other adapts. This leads us to think that this is the most appropriate formal explanation for situations where a power vacuum has been created that must be filled without delay, that is, transitions provoked by a sudden collapse of the authoritarian regime.
A situation of this sort can be perceived in the crises produced, for example, by the military defeat of a dictatorship from abroad. This would be the case of the colonial crisis of Portugal in Africa, which led to the uprising in 1974 of the same armed forces that had carried out the colonial domination, followed by the transitional agreement between the army and the regime's opposition parties. While General Antonio di Spinola became president of the republic, a provisional government led by the centrist Adelino di Palma Carlos, with the participation of Socialists and Communists, was formed, quickly leading to the holding of constituent elections.
As clear, or more so, would be the case of Greece a few months later. Following a failed liberalization in the period of General Papadopoulos, the Ioannides hardliners organized a disastrous military intervention in Cyprus, after which they convoked a "national council" with the opposition of radicals and centrists. This led to the naming of exiled Constatino Karamanlis as first prime minister, while General Fedon Ghizikis remained as temporary head of state until the celebration of elections in November of that same year, 1974. In all of these latter cases there is no such thing as a liberalization process that precedes the democratization, but rather the two take place at the same time. The result obtained, however, is fairly vulnerable, since, unlike the other two models, the two principal actors are motivated to break commitments that had been so urgently and pressingly reached. Hence, the breaking of promises in the postelectoral phase should not surprise us. Reprisals against past authoritarians, as well as destabilizing conspiracies and plans to overthrow the regime, are rela- 1976 -77, Soviet Brazil 1982 -85, Uruguay Greece 1974 , Portugal 1974 , Union 1985 -1991 1983 -84, Chile 1989 -90, Argentina 1982 -83, East Poland, Hungary 1987 -90 Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania 1989 tively frequent (as in the three countries mentioned). Unlike the other two models, in this third model of transition, the "sudden collapse" of the dictatorship does not allow the hard-liners a gradual reconversion to openist positions but gives them an unforeseen role in the negotiations and pacts with the opposition. In the controlledopening-to-the-opposition model the intentions of the openists may have ripened longer, either because from the start the authoritarian regime publicly maintained that its intentions were to return to democracy (as occurred in Brazil) or because their attempts at institutionalizing the regime failed (as occurred with the governmental defeats in the Uruguayan referendum in 1980 and the Chilean in 1988). The Spanish model, or agreed reform, maintains an intermediate pace between the other two. It sprang from a situation of moderate social support for the authoritarian regime, as seen, for example, in the success of the institutionalization of Francoism (including its victory in 1966 in a referendum similar to those already mentioned). However, a sudden event-the death of the dictatoraccelerated the process and oriented it toward democratization. In this latter case, the first free elections had a doubtful constituent character when they were convoked. Instead, in the case of the two models with the participation of the opposition, the process led to the reestablishment of the previous democratic constitution or elections to a constituent assembly with the possibility of deciding the form of government (which signified, for example, that in Greece, unlike Spain, the monarchy was abolished by popular referendum). A summary of the achievements presented is seen in Table 4.2 It should also be possible to apply the formal categories presented up to this point to the transitions from the socialist regimes that have recently taken place in Eastern Europe. At least two categories can be distinguished. For example, we have two processes, those of Poland and Hungary from 1987 to 1990, in which we can perceive a liberalization prior to democratization and where the authoritarian governments developed a certain capacity for initiative. Their dealings seem to correspond in large to the model of cooperation 4-2 (openists and rupturists).
In Poland, the government's defeat in a referendum on economic policy toward the end of 1987, as well as a resurgence of labor strikes in the following months, led to the convocation of a round table in 1989. The president, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, began negotiations with the opposition Solidarnosc movement led by Lech Walesa. As a result of these conversations, free elections were called, but with some restrictions: the communists kept the majority of seats in one of the chambers for themselves, and Jaruzelski was named as president without taking part in the elections.
In Hungary, the liberalization, especially the economic one, had begun in the previous period. But it was also in 1987 when the general secretary of the Communist party, Karoly Grosz, announced the initiation of dialogue between the government party and the opposition. This announcement was followed by the removal of Communist leader Janos Kadar and the isolation of the hard-liners, as well as a series of "national reconciliation meetings" between governmental communists and the opposition round table. Before the celebration of free elections, the openists had time to carry out a series of changes under their own initiative: the opening of frontiers, the proclamation of a nonsocialist republic and the reconversion of the Communist party into a Socialist party to improve its electoral possibilities. The other processes have followed, instead, a much faster pace. It has been said (with a certain chronological imprecision but a suggestive image) that while Poland needed 10 years to rid itself of authoritarian communism, Hungary did it in 10 months, East Germany needed but 10 weeks and Czechoslovakia just 10 days. (It could be added that a little over 10 hours was enough time for Rumania.) The truth is that something close to a sudden collapse of the regime took place in the fall of 1989 in the rest of the countries of Eastern Europe after Poland and Hungary. The opening of the borders by governments and their crossing by citizens, combined with protests in the streets (i.e., as much or more "exit" as "voice") accelerated "tipping" and the downfall of those republics.
In November, hard-liner Egor Krenz, general secretary of the communists in East Germany, opened the Berlin Wall and called free elections, after which he began a round table of negotiations with the Democratic Forum and the opposition parties. In Czechoslovakia, in December, there were direct conversations between the communist leader Ladislav Adamec and the leader of the Civic Forum, Vaclav Havel, which resulted in Havel's rise to the presidency and the formation of a government of national union as a step toward elections. In the same month, in Bulgaria, the head of state and of the party, Petar Mladenov, promised free elections, following which the Communist party started negotiations with the Union of Democratic Forces. In Rumania, a popular revolt and-as everything seems to indicate-a parallel communist and military conspiracy brought down the dictatorship and led to the creation of the National Salvation Front, in which high-ranking members of the communist regime and the opposition coincided, including the newly named president, Ion Iliescu, and Doina Cornea the Christian democrat. It seems, then, that many of reform itself can then lead to a clearer obtainment of the objectives of the rupture (e.g., in Spain, Uruguay, and Hungary). As I have also indicated, in the sudden collapse model, it seems even more logical to expect surprises and a certain instability.
Conclusion
Several nonrevolutionary ways of transition to democracy, with different actors, paces of the process, and contents of the agreements have been identified. One of them, the first phase of which is based on a pact between reformists and continuists of the authoritarian regime, is that that best coincides with the Spanish model, that is, the transition begun in Spain in 1976. A characteristic that distinguishes this model from the others presented is that the opposition does not have the opportunity to intervene directly and conspicuously in the pacts until after the first elections have been held, which concedes to members of the ruling bloc opportunities to introduce some elements of institutional continuity in the future democratic regime.
However, the three models share certain characteristics that can be considered necessary conditions for a transition by agreement. A first condition is the weakness or absence of maximalist actors, because their participation causes disequilibrium and political instability. This formal condition might lead us to explore the social and cultural factors that may explain the greater or lesser relative importance of the gradualist and maximalist actors in a specific society. A second condition is a preference among the gradualist actors for coinciding over confrontation when both outcomes entail pairs of alternatives with the same degree of pressure for change. This formal condition is linked to the existence of subjective attitudes favorable to cooperation or compromise, possibly the result of having learned the lessons of historical experiences of civil wars, the failure of authoritarian regimes, and the suffering caused by repression and violence. Finally, it is necessary that given the greater capacity of threat or deterrence between actors relatively distant, the main actors of the agreement be noncontiguous in a gradation of orders of preference. This condition emphasizes the strategic aspects of the processes of transitions, where political structure and the initiative of some of the actors toward others create interactions that entail various possibilities of negotiations.
Some formal aspects of the analysis here presented could be further advanced-for example, by the study of some interactions or games of three or more players. However, the framework seems to already allow a few retrospective explanations. These can be more descriptively developed and extended to transitions in other countries and other more distant historical periods. In a process of change where one can distinguish several actors by their strategic orientationswhich tends to require a liberalization process-the present formal models should also contain a certain capacity for prediction.
Appendix
In this section the matrices of two-bytwo games of the six actors in transitions to democracy are presented. The natural outcome is always located in the upper left-hand corner of the matrix. In games in which cooperation toward a more efficient outcome is possible ( Figures A-3 Notes I began working on this subject while I was a visit ing scholar at the University of Chicago. I am grate ful to David Laitin, for his welcome at Wilder House, Center for the Study of Politics, History, and Culture, and for all I learned at the seminar, "Rational Models in the Social Sciences," convened by Gary Becker and James Coleman. 1. Limiting to recent declarations by East European politicians to Spaniards, we can mention, for example, those of Romanian prime minister Petre Roman, those of the president of the Czechoslovakian Parliament and former general secretary of the Communist party Alexander Dubcek, and the Polish president Wojciech Jaruzelski, respectively, in "Roman arranca a Gonzalez la firma de un documento," El Pats (Madrid), 18 April 1990; "Gonzalez rinde homenaje a la figura de Dubcek," El Pats, 27
April 1990; and Hermann Tertsch, "Los vecinos no se pueden cambiar," El Pats, 10 June 1990. President George Bush has also presented the Spanish model as "a very special example" for the march to democracy in Eastern Europe (Joss Maria Brunet, "Bush propone a Espafia como modelo para la evolucion de la Europa del Este," La Vanguardia (Barcelona), 20 October 1989. Outside the Spanish context, see, e.g., the repeated comments of veteran Polish oppositionist Adam Michnik, an "enthusiast" of the Spanish way (e.g., "The Two Faces of Europe," New York Review of Books, 19 July 1990).
